In this article we examine the administrative functions being carried out by social organizations (SOs) since 2013, using evidence from Guangdong to demonstrate that the transfer of authority to SOs is selective, tends to create more burdens for local government, and generally does not lead to greater autonomy for SOs. We focus on five types of SOs that are undertaking new administrative functions with varying degrees of operational autonomy, which relates to the consultative authoritarian model proposed by Jessica Teets. Consultative authoritarianism allows for the expansion of relatively autonomous SOs and the development of indirect state control mechanisms. The model is designed to improve governance without democratization by expanding the role played by intermediaries such as SOs in public administration and service delivery. The evidence from Guangdong permits us to conclude that the transfer of authority to SOs allows for innovations in public administration, but that politics continues to motivate government decisions as to which functions are suitable for SOs to undertake, casting doubt on the ability of the Chinese Communist Party to achieve sustainable improvements in local governance and public service provision.
Introduction
The current Chinese leaders, Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang, are striving to achieve economic rebalancing while pushing through complex political reforms aimed at reducing corruption and improving public service efficiencies. In this context we focus on the transfer of authority to social organizations (shehui zuzhi , hereafter SOs), using evidence from Guangdong province to demonstrate that current reforms are creating considerable administrative burdens and are not necessarily leading to greater autonomy for SOs. These findings cast doubt on the ability of the government, under the "consultative authoritarianism" model proposed by Jessica
Teets, to achieve sustainable improvements in local governance and public service provision. for SOs to play a bigger role in public service provision, and proclaimed his support for "streamlining administration and delegating power" (jianzheng fangquan ).
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The 2013 reforms require that each of China's 31 provincial governments commit to the transfer of authority to SOs in accordance with the unified standards set by the State Council.
The provincial government in Guangdong is creating new power sharing arrangements under the institutional architecture set up by the State Council, and as of 2014 transferred 103 specific administrative functions to SOs including legal aid, cultural activities, cooperative programmes, and approval procedures for business licenses and permits. 6 During our research in Guangdong we found that the government's commitment to power sharing and administrative reform does not always lead to improvements in the capacity of SOs for self-management or autonomous 1 Teets 2013, 36.
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The seven rounds of administrative reform have taken place in five-year cycles since 1982. This article begins by conceptualizing the transfer of authority to SOs. We then identify and classify the types of SOs that are undertaking new administrative functions, including statutory agencies, that have yet to feature in any academic study of Chinese public administration. We question the extent to which SOs are willing and able to perform their new functions by comparing the leadership and membership profiles of SOs and the resources at their disposal. After identifying the types of administrative functions that are being undertaken
by SOs in Guangdong, we argue that the transfer of authority to SOs is highly selective and that SOs are primarily concerned with their own survival, which is largely determined by their ability for form and maintain strategic political alliances at a time when the government is reluctant to allow SOs to become powerful and influential in their own right.
Debating the Transfer of Authority
In March 2013 the CCP announced that "social organizations should perform public service provision functions that are suitable for them to provide," giving SOs a new legitimacy to undertake functions that were once the preserve of the government. 7 We believe that there is a deliberate vagueness about the term "suitable" (shihe ) and a lack of clear criteria used by the government to determine what administrative functions SOs are permitted to undertake. In an effort to standardize the transfer of functions and limit variance across China's 31 provinces, There must be an adjustment in the government's organizational structure (decentralization) in order to enhance the quality of governance, to maintain high levels of economic growth and provide life-enhancing outcomes for the public. Our research combines a review of official documents with fieldwork in Guangdong in order to analyse the transfer of authority to SOs according to the policy choices made by government officials who are responsible for the design and implementation of reforms, as well as the responses to these changes from recipient SOs. 17 Shen 1994.
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Methodology
Guangdong, a rich and highly industrialized coastal province in southeast China where the Pearl River Delta is located, is one of the first provinces to transfer authority to SOs.
Guangdong has long featured in debates about central-provincial power relations in China, and the province has secured increasingly flexible arrangements for the implementation of central policies as well as greater discretionary control over local investment and financial planning. We analyse and compare these SOs according to their leadership profiles, whether leaders have a government background or strong government connections, the resources they possess, and their professionalism (real or reputational), and question the extent to which these factors influence the number of new "suitable" functions that SOs are permitted to undertake.
The SO representatives we interviewed were given approval by the government, meaning that we only sampled representatives from "legal" SOs that are officially registered (and are more likely to be trusted) by the government. Only registered SOs are eligible to undertake administrative functions as stipulated by government policy. As Timothy Hildebrandt points out, there are strong incentives for SOs to seek registration, which, contrary to expectations, may afford SOs greater independence to operate in their specific fields and sectors. 
Implementing the Transfer of Authority to SOs
Since the seventh round of administrative reforms in March 2013, an increasing number and range of administrative functions have been transferred to legally registered SOs throughout China. By analysing the role of the local state and the strategies of state engagement one can uncover the factors that shape the development and effectiveness of SOs in specific local settings in China. 30 In this subsection we outline the specific features of SOs in Guangdong that are on the receiving end of administrative transfers, as well as the actual functions that SOs are required to take on, while appreciating the reactions of leaders and members of local SOs to the changes that are taking place. We question the extent to which the "limits of the permissible" are changing in provincial China by profiling five types of SOs in Guangdong. 31 We find that government connections continue to be important for SOs that are competing for public service contracts, and that the new power sharing arrangements under the framework set up by the State Council do not directly undermine government control.
SOs currently operating in Guangdong are facing tight competition for resources. Political resources (capital, connections) are the priority for SOs because of the size and strength of the government in China, the degree of government control over all types of resources, and the government's power to shape the administrative reform process, which includes the power to decide which SOs are required to undertake administrative functions, what functions they are contracted to undertake, and how and when they are undertaken. In effect, the government is attempting to devolve public services and responsibilities to SOs while keeping them within arm's length. During our field research we found the leadership of SOs to be an important factor influencing the ability of SOs to secure resources and government contracts. Vanke is a leading real-estate company in China. Tencent is a leading private IT enterprise in China. ZET is a global technology company specializing in telecoms. Interview with members of the SGCC, Shenzhen, 4 August 2015.
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The 1+15 platform combines emerging industries such as electronics and light emitting diodes (LEDs) with established manufacturing industries and modern service industries that include finance and logistics, positioning Guangdong as a direct and viable competitor with Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan. SMWCF staff are expanding the scope of their activities by securing new government contracts for cooperative projects and service provision, and they are continuing to lobby for more autonomy to perform their administrative functions. For example, in 2015 the SMWCF organized volunteers to collect rubbish from the beach in a cooperative sustainability project called "protect the shoreline" (baowei haianxian ). During the project a shortage of dustbins was identified, and some volunteers from local enterprises offered to provide new bins free of charge, on condition that they be allowed to put their company logos on the bins for publicity. The SMWCF agreed to these terms but was overruled by the Urban Management Bureau and the initiative was blocked. 39 In 2014 the Shenzhen government approved a cooperative project with the SMWCF to manage the Fu Tien Nature Reserve, which includes plans for a new ecological park and educational facilities that are modelled on Hong Kong's world conservation fund management structure, which is more in line with SO expectations for greater operational autonomy.
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Interview with the head of the SMWCF, Shenzhen, 4 August 2015.
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Interview with SMWCF members, Shenzhen, 4 August 2015.
The SMWCF is unique because it is the only SO in our sample that undertakes government functions on a non-profit basis. The elected leader is well-connected, being a member of the Shenzhen People's Political Consultative Conference as well as the SEE Conservation Group, China's largest domestic environmental protection agency. The financial situation for nonprofits such as the SMWCF can be precarious, although the SMWCF raises funds from a wide variety of sources and enjoys high levels of support from local constituents. Moreover, the CCP stands to benefit by using SMWCF projects as evidence of its commitment to sustainability, green growth and collaborative governance.
Shunde Property Management Association
The degree of professionalism, industry-specific skills and experience demonstrated by SOs are key factors that inform the government's decision to transfer authority to SOs. The elected leader of the SPMA is a well-known local entrepreneur in real estate and property management, and the activities of the SPMA reinforce the CCP's commitment to sustainable urbanization and city planning. In this context, the SPMA has interpreted the "right" of SOs to self-regulation quite broadly, and has taken charge of the creation and management of regulatory guidelines, the conducting of annual inspections and quality reviews, and the implementation of sector or industry specific self-disciplinary covenants. 43 Despite the breadth and depth of functions now being carried out, some SPMA personnel argue that the transfer of authority has actually led to greater government control: "the property management industry is becoming more rigid, with a growing number of documents that need to be signed by government. So for us, the real transfer is not from government to society, but rather from society to the government." 
44
Interview with SPMA personnel, Shunde, 5 August 2015.
45
In China, professional titles are officially ranked by administrators according to levels of knowledge, proficiency and work achievement. that "human resources is a relatively professional field, and the decisive factor for selecting this association [the SHRA] was its professionalism and credibility in this area after so many years of development." 48 The head of the SHRA added that "we usually get involved in these activities in the role of service provider, we don't really think we have taken up any position of power or authority." 49 The SHRA is able to take on new administrative functions and expand its role as a trade association SO because of its professionalism and reputation, as well as the positive external environment for human resource management that exists in China today.
In this subsection we found that the profiles and roles of leaders, the acquisition of contracts and government procurement, and the degrees of professionalism and specialization of SOs dictate the number and range of administrative functions that SOs undertake. We discovered that subtle shifts in power sharing arrangements are taking place in Guangdong, although in most cases the government is strategically positioned to take credit for SO successes and to lay blame when things go wrong. The official line is that the transfer of authority to SOs is designed to reduce the burden on local governments and to improve statesociety relations, with the expectation that SOs will benefit from experiential learning and deliver high quality services. At the same time, the government is wary about granting too much autonomy to SOs, which casts doubt on the ability of SOs to become a major force for social and political change in China. Indeed, the transfer of functions to SOs may only serve to 47 Interview with the head of the SHRA, Shunde, 6 August 2015.
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reinforce the strength and legitimacy of the CCP, designed as part of a wider CCP strategy to ensure its political longevity.
The Trouble with Administrative Transfers
The administrative reforms implemented since 2013 have led to some innovations and have created new spaces for SOs to operate and engage with the government and the general public.
In what might be called a hybrid collaborative provision model, SOs are now assuming contractual responsibility for a range of services such as legal aid, community affairs training, property management audits, and the promotion cultural activities. The results are mixed, and find that the transfer of authority to SOs is based on the general assumption that SOs will play a supportive, subsidiary role, administering and implementing programs with truncated decision-making and executive powers. Yijia Jing makes a compelling argument about the declining ability of the government to control SOs and other civic associations in China, leading to an increasingly complex system of political transactions, bargains and exchanges.
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Premier Li Keqiang has recently gone so far as to accuse some SOs of neglecting their core duties and engaging in excessive profiteering and bribery, using the disparaging term "second government" (er zhengfu ) in reference to this type of SO.
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The government is under pressure to monitor and evaluate SOs in order to reduce the risk of malpractice and corruption, which requires expert assistance in the form of evaluation organizations (pinggu xiehui ). Shenzhen is one of the first cities in China to replace the "dual administration" system (shuangchong guanli ) with a streamlined system that simplifies registration procedures and allows for the proliferation of evaluation organizations. 52 The Huixian Public Service Promotion Centre (HPSPC) is a new evaluation organization with only four permanent staff. Despite its small size, the HPSPC is responsible for a range of important functions such as assessing SO projects and attempting to measure the socio-economic consequences of the transfer of authority to SOs, including any risks to the public. We were told that the HPSPC has been given responsibility for major evaluations such 50 Jing 2015, 590.
Guo 2015. The er zhengfu phenomenon was first reported during the Qing Dynasty, when citizens were caught trying to impersonate government officials in order to elicit bribes.
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Yu and Zhou 2013, 401 found that the dual administration system in Wenzhou involved a high level of supervision and inspection designed to prevent joint liability between government or business units and SOs. We believe that the dual system described by Yu and Zhou 2013 is based on interventions in the affairs of SOs under the Professional Guidance Bureau System (guikou ) and the Affiliated Authorities System (guakao danwei ).
as the local impact of the 13th Five Year Plan (2016-2020) on women's development (Guangdong funv fazhan guihua ) and children's development (Guangdong ertong fazhan guihua ), but the current HPSPC head laments the lack of resources available for his SO: "we started with three university postgraduates working here, but now just one remains because we cannot afford [to retain them]. There are not enough opportunities for promotion, and more importantly, we cannot provide attractive salaries." 53 The HPSPC has been forced to change its structure, function and business model in order to remain viable. The HPSPC started out as a local think tank, but in order to survive it had to evolve, and is now engaged in evaluation projects rather than providing policy recommendations and decision-making consultation as stated in the HPSPC's association charter.
In 2014 the HPSPC undertook a project from the Longgang district government to evaluate cooperative projects between the government and SOs. During the evaluation the HPSPC discovered that some of the cooperative projects involving SOs were failing to meet their contractual obligations. For example, a non-profit and professional project that aimed to produce a high-quality textbook for hearing and visually impaired children received 60,000 yuan in government subsidies. The project applicant, with many years of experience in disability education, invited other professional teachers and experts to participate in the project.
After exceeding the planned budget the SO required an additional 90,000 yuan to complete the project but the SO failed to raise the extra money and the experts did not complete their tasks.
The final version of the textbook was substandard, prompting the HPSPC to conclude that "even though we found that the SO could not meet its target, the government department has no legal or efficient way to cancel its contract, so they can blacklist the SO after this project but the losses have already been caused and cannot be recouped." 54 The damages in this case are financial as well as reputational.
The growing demand for regulation and oversight creates a new burden for governments because of the irregularities in dealing with some SOs. We were told that cooperation between the government and SOs is highly problematic, and that district-level officials are overwhelmed and confounded by the volume of applications for new projects and initiatives from SOs,
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Interview with the head of the HPSPC, Shenzhen, 4 August 2015. Examples of development issues for women in the 13th Five Year Plan are access to employment opportunities and enhanced political participation, while issues concerning children include healthcare, education and guidelines for home schooling.
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Interview with the head of the HPSPC, Shenzhen, 4 August 2015.
leading to frank admissions that the government "is not sure what to do, or how to determine which projects should be approved." 55 In response, the Shunde district government has established a new type of SO called a statutory agency. Statutory agencies are to be regulated by a set of specific rules in an effort to avoid the uncertainties that are common in SOs, although this arguably defeats the purpose of the transfer of authority to SOs as originally intended in the 2013 reforms. The expectation in Shunde is that statutory agencies will gradually evolve and become self-sufficient, no longer requiring rigid oversight or excessive financial subsidies.
These expectations are based on a comparative study by the Shunde government that included an investigation of policies and experiences in Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, leading to the conclusion that a new type of statutory agency is a viable option and should be established alongside existing SOs. executive decision-making board consisting of lawyers, accountants, public officials, experts, and entrepreneurs. As a rule, the number of government personnel working for a statutory agency must not exceed one-third of the total personnel. In general terms, the SSIC is responsible for promoting, popularising and facilitating "social innovation" (shehui chuangxin ) in the district. The official goal is to encourage knowledge sharing and social entrepreneurialism in an atmosphere of freedom, creativity and innovation.
Ye Chujun, the current head of the SSIC, is a journalist by trade who graduated from Peking University and has no experience working for government. Though unconfirmed, it is likely that his appointment is the result of his reputation for social innovation in southern China, for example his successful organization of a municipal-level charity contest in the Pearl River Delta in 2012. 57 The current head is appointed by the government but his successors will be 55
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Interview with government officials, Shunde, 6 August 2015.
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Social Work China 2014.
directly elected by members. 58 The SSIC has a deputy director from the Shunde District Committee, providing some government oversight and ensuring that the popular head of the SSCI is kept in check. Working alongside the executive board, there is a finance and personnel committee, a community development committee, a process innovation committee, and a supervisory committee. The SSIC's financial model allows for government procurement of public services, which currently accounts for up to 70 per cent of all funds, with the remainder coming from consultancy fees charged for industrial management and from private fundraising.
The SSIC invested some 17 million yuan in district cultural activities in 2014, with only 7 million yuan coming from government procurement and the rest being funded by private contributions. The long-term plan is for government subsidies to decrease year on year and for statutory agencies to become increasingly self-sufficient and autonomous. It appears therefore that the limits of the permissible are still highly ambiguous in China, where subtle shifts in power, competition and changing perceptions of risk lead to new government priorities, keeping SOs guessing as to which functions are "suitable" for them to undertake.
It is too early to tell if statutory agencies are the way forward. Our preliminary findings from Shunde suggest that statutory agencies are subject to criticism on at least two fronts. First, a number of established SOs consider the current situation to be unjust, arguing that there is a
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Interview in the head of the SSCI, Shunde, 5 August 2015.
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lack of transparency surrounding statutory agencies and questioning the basis upon which statutory agencies are attempting to take control of administrative functions that have been designated for SOs before the expiration of the contracts between SOs and the government.
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Second, there are concerns that statutory agencies lack legitimacy and that their very existence is counterproductive. Specifically, statutory agencies such as the SSIC have been established by regulations from local authorities acting without proper legislative power, adding a degree of regulatory uncertainty at a time when the government is struggling to raise the standard of governance and improve public services for an increasingly restless and demanding population.
Conclusion
The consultative authoritarian model proposed by Jessica Teets should, in theory, allow for the "expansion of relatively autonomous groups and the development of indirect state control What is the real motive for administrative reform and the contractual transfer of authority to SOs? According to official reports the Central Committee of the CCP intends to improve governance and public service provision by streamlining administration and delegating power (jianzheng fangquan ). The government appears to be responding to criticism from Chinese academics, policy analysts and the public that it has continuously overstepped the boundary, claiming responsibility for too many functions and encroaching on private affairs.
By expanding the role of government in all sectors, public service provision has suffered and there have been inefficiencies and inadequacies in quality control, creating an opportunity for SOs to use their specialist skills and professionalism to improve service delivery and operate more effectively. The logical imperative for administrative rollback, decentralization and the
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transfer of authority to SOs has been widely accepted in China, but there are risks and rejoinders about the government's reforms, with some indications that the transfer of authority causes more harm than good. The provincial government in Guangdong has made some innovations in public administration but has been highly selective when it comes to the actual functions and responsibilities that are allocated to SOs. Political considerations and strategies will continue to influence government decisions as to which functions are deemed "suitable"
(shihe ) for local SOs to undertake, how much oversight is required, and what the appropriate balance of power between state, market and society will likely be at the end of the seventh round of administrative reforms in China.
